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International Trade Sanctions related to  
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
 




One of the basic rules in trade law is the freedom of trade. However, such rule 
encounters some limitations when the object of trade is constituted by strategic items, 
such as dual-use items, which may have peaceful (civilian/commercial) or non 
peaceful/military applications. Trade of these categories of goods needs to be 
controlled, as they can provoke security concerns. Such control is pursued through 
control lists, licenses, authorizations to stakeholders of the supply chain, information-
sharing and cooperation mechanisms, reports, records, declarations, screenings and 
sanctions as well. The paper aims at focusing on the issue of sanctions, in particular 
the ones established at the international level: these measures are provided for the 
violation of trade rules in reference to dual-use items, and/or sanctions have as an 
object this type of goods. The legal provisions established by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and at the United Nations level are analysed thereafter. Brief 
observations are offered as regards the EU framework of restrictive measures too. 
 





International trade is mainly characterised by the principles of 
liberalization and free trade. Yet, economic or non-economic reasons can 
interfere with such rule and require the provision of limitations and exceptions.  
Within non-economic reasons, there are the security ones, i.e. cases in 
which the foreign policy or political needs cross the purely economic instances, 
and they entail restrictions to trade. This occurs, for instance, in the hypothesis 
of strategic and ‘sensitive’ items, such as dual-use goods and technologies. 
It is not an easy task to define what ‘dual-use’ means.2 However, there is a 
common understanding that the term refers to goods having either peaceful 
(civilian/commercial) or non peaceful/military applications. They are Weapons 
of Mass Destruction related items (chemical, biological, nuclear materials that 
could be used for proliferation purposes), or arms related items, or items linked 
to the control of information and communication (such as delivery systems and 
surveillance technology used for human rights abuses).  
                                                          
 
PhD, Post-Doctoral fellow BeIPD-COFUND-IPD 2014 Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, 
European Studies Unit, Department of Political Science, University of Liège, Belgium. 
2
 In this context, we make reference to ‘dual-use’ as applied to Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) export controls, keeping aside the broader notion of ‘dual-use dilemma’, which means 
that a research or its applications may be used for civilian uses or for building weapons and 
other military purposes.  
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The control of these items shall cover the whole supply chain, including 
design, development, production, possession, delivery, transport, transit, trans-
shipment, financing, brokering, exports, re-exports, transfers and imports of 
goods. The ways for pursuing the control of dual-use goods can consist of 
granting or denying licenses and authorizations to stakeholders, promoting 
information-sharing and cooperation mechanisms, such as through reports, 
records, declarations, screenings, and imposing sanctions in case of violation of 
trade control rules. Therefore, the issue of sanctions is a relevant component of 
control of dual-use goods.  
This paper aims at analyzing sanctions related to dual-use goods, in 
particular the international ones (with the addition of brief observations on the 





International sanctions for the trade of dual-use items are mainly imposed 
at the level of the United Nations (UN). Indeed, the Security Council (SC) has 
intervened against the threat of peace and security through trade measures 
covering dual-use goods as well.  
Furthermore, at the international level, an organization that has dealt with 
the possibility of economic measures for non-economic reasons is the World 
Trade Organization (WTO): it should be observed, though, that the WTO itself 
has never imposed those sanctions as such upon States, but it has allowed 
States introducing them at the national level, by giving them the legal basis for 
doing so. Moreover, it has confirmed and strengthened the UN interventions, 
even if the legal basis and the legitimacy for the UN sanctions derive from the 
UN Charter, and not from the WTO rules.  
So, internationally speaking, dual-use sanctions are: (a) justified under the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, which is part of the 
WTO framework, and (b) imposed by the Security Council in the form of 
embargoes or trade restrictions for peace and security purposes. 
These two frameworks (the GATT/WTO and the UN one) will be 
considered thereafter in their features and effects. A critical examination will 
be offered too.  
 
 
The GATT Framework: Art. XXI 
 
Since 1947 when the GATT was established in Geneva by 23 initial 
countries, in order to foster a new international economic cooperation after the 
disasters of the World War II,
3
 the approach towards trade law was 
characterised by liberalization and free trade. These remain still now the basic 
principles of international trade: indeed, the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
                                                          
3
 Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes (2009).   
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born in 1997 on the basis of GATT and currently having 162 members
4
, has 
adopted them as essential rules in all the agreements related to goods, services, 
and intellectual property rights (i.e., the GATT, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)), as well as in agreements dealing with specific 
sectors or issues, such as agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
trade related investment measures, etc., and plurilateral trade agreements about 
trade civil aircrafts and public procurements.  
The WTO has focused on cases in which security reasons compete with 
economic liberalism, thus introducing an exception for trade bans and 
limitations taken for non-economic and political motivations. The provision of 
reference is article XXI of the GATT.
5
 It is known as ‘security exception’, 
which “embraces five broad categories: (1) national security information; (2) 
nuclear material; (3) military goods and services; (4) war and international 
emergencies; and (5) UN Charter obligations”.6 
Such provision allows States to invoke security reasons for justifying 
limitations to trade. In general terms, the provision permits derogation with any 
article of the GATT itself, as it is an all-embracing norm. 
 
Subjective Categories: Letters (a) and (b) 
   
Letter (a) allows for derogation of GATT principles for denying furnishing 
“information” linked to security interests. Thus, the WTO Member is free to 
define its security needs and to refuse to disclose sensitive information, 
provided that it informs other States, to the fullest extent possible, of the 
measures taken under art. XXI. This provision has been invoked only in the 
case of US restriction on export of strategic goods. Czechoslovakia requested 
to specify the items considered as strategic, but the US refused on the basis of 
art. XXI (a).
7
 This letter could permit trade restrictions on information 
concerning dual-use items too. 
As for letter (b), it is subdivided into three subparagraphs. In general, this 
exception is referred to “action”.  
                                                          
4
 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
5
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 UNTS 
194. Art. XXI states: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any 
contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its 
essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to 
fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;  (ii) relating to the traffic in 
arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is 
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;  (iii) 
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or  (c) to prevent any 
contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security”. 
6
 Alford (2011) pp. 703-704. The same “security exception” appears in GATS (art. XIV bis), 
and in the TRIPS (art. 73). 
7
 GATT/CP.3/38, p. 9. 
Vol. 2, No. 4        Colussi: International Trade Sanctions related... 
                         
240 
Such action can concern “fissionable materials or materials from which 
they are derived” (letter (b), (i)). This means that States can derogate to GATT 
provisions for limiting the trade of nuclear materials. This provision has been 
interpreted into two ways: according to a minimalist view, security exceptions 
are allowed only if they related to nuclear materials arising proliferations fears. 
According to a maximalist one, instead, the exception could be extended until 
covering nuclear activities used for energy needs as well. Some scholars affirm 
that when the GATT was negotiated, the atomic bomb had been recently 
launched, and thus there was the urgency of limiting nuclear materials for 
proliferation concerns. In reality, the specific geo-political context of the Fifties 
shows that in those years the quantity of fissile material available for industrial 
exploitation was limited. So, the countries holding it were interested in 
controlling the access to resources and particularly to fissionable materials for 
their national strategic interest, i.e. for energy needs. The non proliferation 
concern was not perceived before the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. Anyway, the minimalist 
interpretation as concerning the risk of nuclear proliferation only is nowadays 
the most suitable interpretation of letter (b) (i), although there has been no 
concrete application of such subparagraph so far.  
Letter (b) (ii) involves “traffic in arms, ammunition or implements of war”. 
At first sight, the term “arms” would be refer to conventional arms. Yet, the 
notion has never been defined, and States have invoked it to cover strategic 
goods in general as related to military establishments, thus including dual-use 
good too.
8
 Again, the interpretation of the term is left upon States. It is likely 
that all the items listed in the different international export control regimes,
9
 if 
supplying a military establishment, are meant to be justified under art. XXI (b) 
(ii).  
Finally, the third subparagraph (iii) takes into account actions “taken in 
time of war or other emergency in international relations”.  
The first part has been invoked, for example, in case of boycott by the 
Arab League to Israel (1970), for the suspension of Argentine imports into the 
European Community during the Falkland War between the UK and Argentina 
(1982), or for the embargo upon Nicaraguan products by the USA in 1985.  
As a matter of example, in the case of Falkland/Malvinas War, the GATT 
Council justified trade embargo by the European Communities on Argentina, 
stating that art. XXI does not contain an obligation for Members to notify 
                                                          
8GATT, Analytical Index: “Guide to Law and practice”, p. 602-603. https://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf. 
9
 These are international fora of countries involved in the supply of dual-use items and aiming 
at the regulation of their trade through ‘soft-law’ rules and guidelines to be applied to 
exporters. They are: the Zangger Committee (1972-74) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(1975), focused on nuclear items; the Australia Group (1984-85) dealing with biological and 
chemical items; the Wassenaar Arragement (1994) focused on conventional weapons and dual-
use goods and technologies; the Missile Technology Control Regime (1987) referred to space 
launch vehicles and ballistic missiles. There was also the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), created in 1949 and closed in 1994, because it was 
replaced by Wassenaar Arrangement. 
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measures taken pursuant to the ‘security exception’; however, “WTO Members 
should be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under 
Article XXI”.10 
During Nicaragua-USA conflict, the GATT Panel, which was considered 
by some States as the body in charge with the review of the clause, as to avoid 
its illicit and arbitrary use,
11
 affirmed that embargoes “ran counter to basic 
aims of the GATT, namely to foster non discriminatory and open trade policies, 
to further the development of the less developed contracting parties and to 
reduce uncertainty in trade relations”.12 Yet, they could be permitted for 
security reasons, but each State has to balance security with the maintenance of 
stable trade relations. Moreover, the Panel specified that it was not possible to 
submit the security cause to judicial review or before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body. 
So, embargoes on dual-use items taken in time of war of in emergency 
situations could then be justified under art. XXI (b) (iii). 
 
Objective Category: Letter (c) 
 
Letter (c) of art. XXI GATT is the only objective category, i.e. it is not 
subject to States’ national interpretation. It does not contain the expression 
“which it considers” that refers to the States’ self-judgment of the existence 
and relevance of security needs. It affirms that if States have to comply with 
UN obligations, they are justified under art. XXI (c). Anyway, since this 
obligation derives upon States from Art. 48 UN Charter, it can be affirmed that 
letter (c) is mainly useless. It implies that the compliance with UN obligations 
is prevalent over the compliance with GATT obligations.  
One meaningful case of the application of this provision can be the case of 
sanctions upon ex-Yugoslavia. In the Nineties, during the Balkan war, the 
European Communities intervened firstly breaking up peace talks, and then 
imposing trade sanctions on Yugoslavia through resolution 757 (1992), 
followed by the US embargoes. So, UN States were banned from importing 
and exporting with Yugoslavia.
13
  
The same letter (c) has been invoked by India in reference to UN sanctions 
to Iraq, Fiji, Serbia and Montenegro.
14
  
So far, the WTO Appellate Body and the Dispute Settlement Panels have 
not intervened for its interpretation. However, the doctrine considers that the 
States’ limitations or bans to trade for security interests do not need exclusively 
                                                          
10
 See Decision of 30 November 1982, L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982). https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/ 
English/SULPDF/91000212.pdf 
11
 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, India, Nicaragua, Peru, and Spain supported 
this position. 
12
 Panel Report, United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 5.1–5.17, L/6053 (Oct. 
13, 1986). http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF /91240197.pdf. 
13
 States mention such implementation of UN measures, as authorised by art. XXI (c) GATT, 
in licensing notification documents. See GATT, Analytical Index, cit., p. 605. 
14
 L/5640/Add.7/Rev.6, 18 August 1994. 
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nor expressly the intervention of the Security Council.
15
 Indeed, art. XXI (c) 
refers to UN Charter in general and to the interventions as much as they are 
anchored in the defence for peace and security.  
In the current situation of sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US,
16
 
Russia has threatened to report the issue at the WTO. Although a UN SC 
resolution against Russia has not been approved, the EU and the US could 
claim to have acted in the respect of UN obligations, referring to art. XXI letter 
(c): indeed, Russia is continuing violating the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 68/262 (“Territorial integrity of Ukraine”, 27 March 2014), which 
“calls upon all States to desist and refrain from actions aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and integrity of Ukraine, including any 
attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders through threat or use of force or other 
unlawful means” (paragraph 1). Yet, the EU and the US could make reference 
to other provisions of art. XXI GATT as well.  
 
Observations on GATT’s Provisions 
 
Until now, there has been no GATT or WTO case law clarifying the 
meaning of article XXI,
17
 nor there is a consensus as to whether the conditions 
of art. XXI invoked by a State are reviewable by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body. However, even if the States have not abused of this provision so far, it 
would be needed to better clarify the scope and extent of such ‘security 
exception’ through a proper intervention of the competent WTO bodies,18 in 
order to avoid misunderstandings and mala fide interpretations. Indeed, it is 
evident that the provisions of art. XXI GATT is broadly written, as to leave 
space to States’ own evaluation and interpretation of ‘security’, and the WTO 
bodies have restrained themselves from intervening.  
In conclusion, it is conceivable that the limitations for trade of dual-use 
items and related sanctions could be allowed on the basis of art. XXI under the 
national interpretation of “essential security interests”. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Desierto, D. A. 2014. The EU/US v. Russia Trade Wars: Revisiting GATT Article XXI and 




 In the EU: Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014, Official Journal L 229/2014; 
Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014, in Official Journal L 229/2014; 
Council Decision 2014/508/CFSP of 30 July 2014, in Official Journal L 226/2014; Council 
Decision 2014/659/CFSP of 8 September 2014, in Official Journal L 271/2014, and Council 
Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 of 8 September 2014, in Official Journal L 271/2014. In the 
USA: Executive Order 13660 of 6 March 2014, Blocking Property of Certain Persons and 
Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine; Ex. Order 
13661 of 17 March 2014; Executive Order 13685 of 19 December 2014. 
17
 Barbour (2010).   
18
 La Fortune (2014). 
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The UN System 
 
In general terms, UN sanctions can address States (‘comprehensive or 
broad-based sanctions’), or single individuals/enterprises (‘targeted or smart 
sanctions’),19 and they can be imposed for coercive purposes (when sanctions 
seek behavioural change from groups and individuals held responsible for an 
illicit behaviour), or to constrain (looking for undermining the targets’ 
capacities to achieve their objectives), or in order to signal the disapproval of 
certain actions. 
UN sanctions may consist of economic or non-economic measures.  
The first group includes: (i) the interruption in normal economic 
transactions or restriction of access to economic resources for a target country. 
This is the case of embargo to a country, and it can be referred to all its 
resources (‘comprehensive embargo’) or to specific goods, such as arms, some 
services like technical assistance and trainings (this is a ‘selective embargo’),20 
and (ii) financial sanctions, consisting in restrictions on support for trade, and 




Non-economic sanctions are: transport measures (preventing a person from 
getting a visa, or banning aircrafts from entering or transiting a country), and 
political and diplomatic measures (consisting in the expulsion of diplomats, the 
restrictions or breaking of diplomatic relationships with a country, or the 
suspension or expulsion of the target state from international organizations).  
UN sanctions having as an object dual-use goods are economic in nature, 
but their aim is to obtain political or policy results, such as the determination of 
a change in political regime change, the blockage of a proliferation program, 
the end of the violation of human rights and democratic liberties, etc.  
They can be legally binding (formal) sanctions and non-legally binding 
(informal) ones. 
 
Formal Legally Binding Sanctions: Chapter VII UN Charter and UN 
Resolutions  
 
During the phase of existence of the League of Nations, sanctions were 
imposed for the cross border aggression by Yugoslavia (1921); against Greece 
(1925); and Italy (1935) for the invasion of Ethiopia. The Covenant of the 
League of Nations (art. 16) stated that if any League member resorted to war 
against another member, all other members were immediately and 
automatically to subject the former to a severance of all trade and financial 
relations: this was a ‘primitive’ form of sanctions (art. 16). 
Then, during the Cold War, the Security Council imposed sanctions only 
against Southern Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979 for its unilateral declaration of 
independence from Great Britain, and in the form of voluntary and mandatory 
                                                          
19
 Hufbauer and Oegg (2000). 
20
 Chan and Drury (2000); Fruchart,  Holtom and Wezeman (2007).  . 
21
 Tostensen and Bull (2002).   
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arms embargo in 1963 and 1977 respectively, to pressure the South African 
regime to end apartheid.
22
 
In the last decades, sanctions have increased, finding their legal basis in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”: it states that, in case of 
threats to peace and security, or aggressions, the Security Council – after the 
initial determination of the existence of threat (art. 39) - could provide upon a 
State the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, 




 Before opting for Chapter VII, it is proper that the SC acts under Chapter 
VI (Pacific settlement of Disputes), as art. 41 represents an extrema ratio. 
It is conceivable that the SC may decide to interrupt economic relations 
with the countries possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or that 
are liable for trading and having sensitive commodities and dual-use items, as 
long as the possession/trade represents a breach to peace and security. 
   When the SC decides for imposing sanctions, it should take into account 
the respect of the purposes and principles of the UN (art. 24 UN Charter), the 
principles of justice and international law (art. 1.1), equal rights and self-
determination of peoples (art. 1.2) and the respect of other human rights (art. 
55). 
The SC exercises its power through Resolutions,
 24 
 whose adoption 
requires a majority of 9 of the 15 members, and no veto by any of the five 
permanent members.  
Along with the enactment of the resolution, a Sanctions Committee for 
monitoring the implementation of sanctions is established,
25
 as well as a Panel 
of Experts to assist the Committee. These two bodies release reports by 
consensus. There is also a SC Subsidiary Organ Branch, placed in the SC 
Affairs Division, which is responsible for the monitoring of the implementation 
of sanctions. 
Such resolutions are compulsory for all UN members on the basis of art. 
2.5, 25, and 48.1 of the UN Charter. Even UN non members are called upon to 
cooperate for the implementation of resolutions, according to art. 2.6. 
A tendency can be observed in the field of sanctions: during the Cold War 
and until the Nineties, the preference was given to comprehensive sanctions 
                                                          
22
 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) pp. 24-25, 33-34, 285-286. 
23
 A limited role is recognised upon the Assembly General, which can decide on the expulsion 
of a State from the UN, or the suspension of its rights because of violation of the measures 
decided by the SC. This power based on art. 5 of UN Charter has never been exercised. 
Moreover, the AG can recommend some restrictive measures towards a State, but the SC is not 
obliged to adopt them. 
24
 For all the resolutions, see http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/.  
25
 Sanction Committees are pursuant to art. 29 of UN Charter and Rule 28 of the Security 
Council’s provisional rules of procedure. 
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referred to the whole target State,
26
 as it occurred for cases of nuclear 
proliferation, civil wars and cross-border conflicts, terrorism. Then, because of 
the humanitarian consequences of sanctions affecting indiscriminately the non 
responsible civilians, the UNSC preferred addressing specific listed people and 
groups.
27
 In this latter hypothesis, Member States usually propose targeted 
candidates to the Sanctions Committees. They are listed if they constitute a 
threat to peace, security or stability, violate an arms embargo, support armed 
groups through illegal commodity trade, and boost WMD proliferation.  
With regards to sanctions on dual-use items, it can be noted that the UN 
has never mentioned the expression ‘dual-use’ as such, nor has it given a 
definition. This has occurred because the notion is quite fuzzy and the 
continuous evolution of the science and technology does not permit to offer a 
workable definition. Moreover, providing an embargo on dual-use items 
generically considered would not be proportional, as it could cover too many 
goods. Therefore, the UNSC has preferred imposing sanctions on a case-by-
case basis upon specific goods, or it has made reference to lists of items 
already disposed within export control regimes and fora.  
Historically speaking, the UN has prevented the States from exporting to 
Iran and Iraq chemical weapons and related products that could be used for the 
production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (resolution 612 (1988)). Then, in 
resolution 687 (1991) Iraq was requested to destroy and remove all the WMD 
arsenals (chemical and biological arsenals, and ballistic missiles: paragraph 8), 
and it was subject to an embargo on WMD dual-use related items, technology 
and materials (paragraphs 10, 12, 20 and 24). 
In case of Iran, resolution 1696 (2006) required States to “prevent the 
transfers of any items, materials, good and technology that could contribute to 
Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile 
programmes” (paragraph 5). Resolution 1737 (2006) added the prohibition of 
technical or financial assistance, training, or resources related to certain nuclear 
and ballistic missile-related goods (paragraph 6), while the further resolution 
1747 (2007) banned the supply, sale, or transfer of major military weapons 
systems and related material to Iran (paragraph 6), and it prevented the entry or 
transit of people involved with Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities 
or in the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, such as for the 
procurement of the prohibited dual-use items, goods, equipment, materials and 
technology (paragraph 2).  
The reference to export control lists of items has occurred in the context of 
sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK):28 for 
                                                          
26




 In 1998/1999 at the Interlaken Process the focus was posed on targeted financial sanctions; 
at the Bonn-Berlin Process (1999/2000) on travel and air traffic related sanctions; and at the 
Stockholm Process on the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions (2002/2003). 
See Fernandez (2012). 
28
 See also resolution 1695 (2006) which required the States to prevent missile and missile-
related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK’s missile or WMD 
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example, resolution 1718 (2006) provided an embargo on items as set out in 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group Lists and Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MCTR), also taking into account Australia Group list, and it banned any form 
of transfer and procurement of those items (paragraph 8 (a) and (b)).  
As for targeted sanctions having a link with dual-use goods, States have 
been prevented from sale, supply, or transfer the chemical acetic anhydrite to 
any person in the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control (through 
resolution 1333 (2000), paragraph 10, and resolution 2160 (2014) paragraph 9).  
 
Informal Sanctions at the UN Level  
 
Security Council can deal with sanctions in an informal way too, i.e. 
through Presidential Statements, which are not legally binding for UN States. 
They are not even envisaged in the UN Charter but developed in the practice, 
and they are adopted at a formal meeting of the Council and issued as an 
official document of the Council.
29
 
Presidential Statements usually condemn certain situations and call upon 
for deeper measures. For instance, in case of North Korea, several statements 
have strongly condemned the DPRK’s activities, such as the statement in April 
2012,
30
 directing the Sanctions Committee to take steps to update and 
strengthen the sanctions regime, or the statement condemning the 26 March 
2010 attack which led to the sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan,
31
 or the 
one against the 5 April 2009 launch of a rocket by DPRK.
32
 In case of Iran, 
likewise, the SC has expressed his condemnation for nuclear activities and 
requested Iran to suspend all activities related to nuclear enrichment and 




Presidential Statements sometimes intervene on targeted sanctions too. 
The explicit imposition or termination of sanctions has never occurred 
through a Presidential Statement, but it has been an instrument for preceding or 
confirming those decisions assumed by the SC, thus working as a complement 
to the content of a SC resolution. In reality, they are preferred when the UNSC 
cannot reach consensus, or it is blocked by veto for adopting a resolution.  
The adoption of these Statements requires consensus, although Security 
Council members may abstain.  
 
Observations on the UN Regime 
 
The main problem of UN sanctions is the issue of implementation and 
enforcement of sanctions: indeed, in the international society there are no 
                                                                                                                                                         
programmes, as well as the procurement of those items, and any financial resources in relation 
to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes (paragraphs 3 and 4). 
29
 See Talmon (2003).   
30
 Statement, 16 April 2012, S/PRST/2012/13. 
31
 Statement, 9 July 2010, S/PRST/2010/13. 
32
 Statement 13 April 2009, S/PRST/2009/7. 
33
 Statement 9 March 2006, S/PRST/2006/15. 
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public authorities with executive, police and judicial powers like the ones in 
national States. As known, the international community is still a system of 
States claiming for sovereignty, and based on the States’ voluntary acceptance 
of committing to international rules. Therefore, the enforcement of adopted 
sanctions remains weak, despite the draft of recommendations that boost for 
better systems of monitoring.
34
 The UN tries to engage other organizations in 
the control phase, such as the IAEA (e.g., the case of the verification of Iran’s 
compliance with resolution 2231 (2015)), or through the creation of Special 
Commissions (such as the International Commission of Inquiry, UNICOI, 
established by resolution 1013 (1995) for the control of the supply of arms and 
materials to Rwandan government forces). However, it results that the ultimate 
controller of sanctions is the SC itself. 
Another issue is the lack of clarity of some terms, which can create 
discrepancies among States, or the broad margin of appreciation left to States. 
For instance, in case of resolution 1737 (2006) against Iran, States have the 
right to choose which items of the Nuclear Suppliers Group dual-use control 
list would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-
related activities.  
Moreover, some UN sanctions regimes have appeared not to properly 
protect the human rights of targeted people, who have claimed the violation of 
their rights to due process. Because of the importance of international and 
regional human rights law, the UN has felt the need to strengthen human rights 
in the context of sanctions too through the creation of Focal Points for 
Delisting (established within the Secretariat by resolution 1730 (2006)) and the 
inauguration of the Office of the Ombudsperson (by resolution 1904 (2009) to 
review delisting requests for the Al-Qaida regime only, and recently with res. 
2253 (2015) for ISIL (Da’esh) regime too). However, despite the existence of 
these two bodies, the system still needs improvements: the Focal Point has 
demonstrated scarce effective results, and the Ombudsman has a limited 
mandate.
35
 Yet, the proposals to expand their role have been blocked.
36
 
A central topic is the effectiveness of sanctions, i.e. sanctions’ capacity to 
produce the effects they pursue. Indeed, sanctions can determine consequences 
at the political, economic, social and humanitarian level (e.g., the increase of 
authoritarian powers and corruption, inflation, recession, poverty, deterioration 
of living conditions, etc.), and these effects could sometimes affect 
neighbouring States or third States too in unexpected ways, such as favouring 
other markets. It is, thus, important to evaluate a priori the intensity of 
sanctions, and define clearly their strategic objectives. In this sense, it is also 
central that the SC or other UN bodies verify and progressively and constantly 
check the impact of sanctions.  
                                                          
34
 UN Security Council. 2006. Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council 




 Hovell (2016). 
36
 See UN Doc. S/2014/725, Concept Paper on Security Council Working Methods (Oct. 8, 
2014), discussed on the Security Council Working Methods, 7285th Meeting of the SC. 
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Some scholars suggest that, in order for sanctions to be effective, they 
should be part of a broader strategy, as they are not a panacea, and require 
cooperation inside the UN bodies, and with external stakeholders, such as the States 





Brief Observations on the European Union Level 
 
The framework of trade sanctions enacted at the international level is 
complemented by regional sanctions, such as at the European Union level, 
where a specific sanctions policy towards third countries exists.  
Similarly to the UN level, restrictive measures have addressed both the 
countries as such and targeted individuals. Here again two categories of 
sanctions can be individuated: (a) formal ones, adopted in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework, through a Council Decision, 
eventually followed by a Regulation
38
; and (b) informal ones, introduced 
outside the CFSP, and mainly having have a diplomatic, political or financial 
nature (with the only exception of an arms embargo to China, imposed 
informally in 1989 through a Presidential Statement). 
The first category, in particular, shows the role of the EU in: (i) ‘rewriting’ 
the UNSC resolutions into EU law, thus giving implementation to them (for 
example, Common Position 2003/495/CFSP on Iraq); (ii) supplementing the 
UN measures (e.g., Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP and Council Regulation 
(EU) No 267/2012 against Iran); and (iii) autonomously formulating EU 




In reference to dual-use goods, the EU has adopted sanctions against Iran, 
Syria and North Korea, such as the Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP 
prohibiting direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran of materials listed 
in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in the Missile Technology Control Regime 
lists, in the Regulation 428/2009 (known as the “EU dual-use regulation”) and 
in UNSC resolutions; Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP against Syria, 
prohibiting the export of certain dual use items related telecommunication or 
internet monitoring or interception items and technology, and Regulation 
509/2012 on dual-use chemicals; and the recent Council Regulation (EU) 




                                                          
37
 Elliott (1998).   
38
 It depends on the object of the sanctions: indeed, if the sanctions consist of a general 
embargo (included embargo on dual-use items), or financial measures, the Council Decision – 
adopted on the basis of art. 29 TEU – should be followed by a Regulation pursuant to art. 215.1 
TFEU; otherwise, if the objects are arms embargoes or travel bans, the Council Decision is 
directly implemented by Member States and no other act is needed. With reference to sanctions 
against individuals, they are taken on the basis of art. 215.2 and art. 75 TFEU. 
39
 For the list of EU sanctions, see: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_ en.pdf. 
40
 The role of the European Court of Justice in the area of sanctions is meaningful, and it 
should be taken into account in the interpretation of regimes: See, for example, as for Iranian 
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Some Critical Remarks 
 
The analysis developed above shows that dual-use items need measures of 
control. They are placed at the intersection at commercial rules, and foreign 
policy and security interests: indeed, it is needed to find a balance between the 
allowance of business, and the worries that some items can be commercialised 
in order to be used with malevolent purposes. It explains why the international 
and regional organizations (as well as single Member States) have taken an 
active role in the issues of trade control involving dual-use goods. However, by 
virtue of their different mission, the organizations have assumed different 
positions.  
The WTO, because of its vocation to ensure free trade, has taken into 
account security needs in the regulation of commerce, but from a trade-focused 
perspective, and thus it has left broad space to States and to their policies of 
national sovereignty. Indeed, the GATT provisions are quite vague on the 
definitions of terms, and in particular of the expression “essential security 
interests”, which is the ‘key brick’ for triggering the limitations to trade of 
dual–use items, theoretically allows for many interpretations by States. Such 
formula could be used in arbitrary ways too, and so it is important to control 
possible slippery slopes in that sense.  
What emerges in the WTO context is thus the big margin of intervention 
for States, which is more limited in the UN: here the focus is posed on peace 
and security, as these are the core values at the basis of the mission of the 
organization, and so even commercial relationships and networks are evaluated 
under this viewpoint. For this reason, the UN is more prone to intervene on 
trade of dual-use items when (and provided that) they threaten international 
peace. However, it does not mean that the States have no role at all: on the 
contrary, as known, the international community is still composed on sovereign 
countries. Therefore, States possess a relevant duty in the implementation and 
application of UN sanctions, even if mechanisms for ensuring the effective 
compliance are lacking and it should be improved. 
At the regional level, the existing agencies and organizations could be the 
longa manus of international organizations for applying sanctions: the EU, for 
instance, has positioned itself at the avant-garde in the promotion of UN values 
in the trade field as well, and has demonstrated to be very active in shaping 
autonomous measures, in the name of peace. Even if it is born for commercial 
reasons, in the course of time it has broadened its horizons to cover foreign 
policy issues too. However, the reluctance of many States to recognise the role 
of the EU in this direction and to renounce to pieces of their sovereignty makes 
it difficult to ensure an effective system of sanctions. Therefore, the EU 
sanctions regimes should be optimised and implemented. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
entities, case T-181/13, Sharif University of Technology v Council; case T-494/10, Bank 
Saderat Iran v Council; case T-35/10, Bank Melli Iran v Council; case T-13/11, Post Bank Iran 
v Council.  
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The analysis conducted above shows that the category of dual-use items 
requires a particular attention within trade law. Indeed, their sensitiveness in 
terms of security concerns is not negligible.  
Dual-use goods challenge the “free trade dogma” which is dominant in 
trade law, and demand specific measures of control, in order to avoid 
especially the proliferation concerns that they may arise (in relation to 
Weapons of Mass Destruction).  
Sanctions can be considered as an interesting method in this regard.  
At the international level, sanctions having as an object dual-use goods 
find their legal basis in the WTO context, in particular art. XXI GATT, which 
provides an exception on liberalism for security reasons. On the other hand, 
one of the most prolific and active actors of sanctions covering dual-use items 
too has been the UN Security Council, which has intervened in several 
occasions, through embargoes and targeted measures on individuals or groups 
trading these items. 
At the regional level, then, in particular in the European territorial space, it 
is evident the role of the European Union, both for implementing UN measures 
and for imposing autonomous ones.  
All this demonstrates that there exists a multi-level framework of dual-use 
related sanctions. Despite the difficulties in their implementation and 
monitoring, sanctions may represent a significant contribution in the need for 





Alford, R.P. (2011). ‘The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception’ in 2011 Utah Law 
Review 3: 697-759.  
Atlas, R.M. and M.R. Dando (2006). ‘The ‘Dual-use Dilemma’ for the Life Sciences: 
Perspectives, Conundrums, and Global Solutions’ in 2006 Biosecurity 
Bioterrorism. 3, 4:276–286. 
Barbour, E.C. (2010). Trade Law: An Introduction to Selected International 
Agreements and U.S. Law. Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. 
Chan, S. and A.C. Drury (2000). ‘Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: an Overview’, in 
Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice (S. Chan and A. C. 
Drury, eds.) Palgrave Macmillan Press, New York, NY, 1-16. 
Desierto, D.A. (2014). The EU/US v. Russia Trade Wars: Revisiting GATT Article 
XXI and the International Law on Unilateral Economic Sanctions. EJIL Talk 
(Sept. 2014). http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-euus-v-russia-trade-wars-revisiting-gatt-
article-xxi-and-the-international-law-on-unilateral-economic-sanctions-2/ 
Elliott, K.A. (1998). The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Half Empty?. International 
Security 23(1): 50-65. 
Fernandez, J.W. (2012). Smart Sanctions: Confronting Security Threats with 
Economic Statecraft. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/196875.htm  
Fruchart, D., Holtom, P. and S.T. Wezeman (2007). United Nations Arms Embargoes. 
Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour. Stockholm International 
Athens Journal of Law October 2016 
             
251 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala, Sweden.
 
Hovell, D. (2016). The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security 
Council Sanctions Decision-Making. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Hufbauer, G.C. (1997). Economic Sanctions: America’s Folly. Transcript of the 
Presentation before the Council of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 10, 1997. 
http://www.cfr.org/trade/economic-sanctions-americas-folly/p62 
Hufbauer, G.C. and B. Oegg (2000). Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?. Paper 
for a symposium on ‘Sanctions Reform? Evaluating the Economic Weapon in 
Asia and the World’, Febr. 23, 2000. https://www.piie.com/publications/papers/ 
paper.cfm?ResearchID=371 
Hufbauer, G.C., Schott, J. and K.A. Elliott (1990). Economic Sanctions  Reconsidered. 
Supplemental Case Histories. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC. 
Irwin, D.A., Mavroidis, P.C., and A.O. Sykes (2009). The genesis of the GATT. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
La Fortune, G. (2014). WTO Rules and Sanctions on Russian Trade. Oct. 9, 2014. 
http://www.wl-tradelaw.com/wto-rules-and-sanctions-on-russian-trade/ 
Talmon, S. (2003). ‘The Statements of the President of the Security Council’ in 
Chinese Journal of International Law 2 (2): 419-466. 
Tostensen, A. and B. Bull (2002). ‘Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?’ in World Politics 
54:3:373-403. 
Vol. 2, No. 4        Colussi: International Trade Sanctions related... 
                         
252 
 
